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Taipei's military modernization effort also includes substantial upgrades to Taiwan's navy, particularly in the areas of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare as a counter to possible blockade and sea denial efforts by China's navy. Taiwan has stated that its number one priority is to acquire submarines. The U.S. has thus far refused and PRC pressure has been successful in preventing other countries from providing them. Equally important to Taiwan's military modernization drive are the sale of advanced training systems, sensors, software, electronic countermeasures equipment, mission planning systems, and night vision technologies, along with the provision of technical assistance to integrate these weapons and systems into Taiwan's military force structure.
Taiwan, which for many years had one of the fastest growing economies, has become one of the biggest arms buyers in the world and one of the most important customers for the U.S. defense industry. Foreign imports and indigenous production have ensured that Taiwanese military forces are among the best equipped in the world. While it does not get everything it wants, Taiwan's military has achieved a strong and credible fourth-generation air and naval capability and its ground forces are generally considered to be well-equipped. The armed forces also have modern support facilities in terms of ports, airfields, shipyards, a sophisticated industrial infrastructure, a skilled work force, and an advanced military research development and production program. However, questions persist about their ability to integrate and maintain this diverse array of military equipment into their force structure. Equally uncertain is the ability of each service to operate in a coordinated manner in order to achieve a joint war fighting capability in support of their national military strategy. 11 Background China has sharply criticized U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a violation of the 1982 Joint Communique. According to Paragraph 6 of the Communique, the U.S. stated that it will not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to Taiwan; it will not make sales that exceed either in quality or quantity the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations with China; and it does intend to gradually reduce its sale of arms, leading over a period of time to a final resolution of the Taiwan issue. The U.S. position is that the 1979 TRA guides its actions and its arms sales are consistent with the Communique because they are defensive in nature and come in response to PRC military efforts that threaten Taiwan. Paragraph 7 of the Communique requires both governments to make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of the issue. China's military modernization efforts, military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue have prompted U.S. officials to question China's commitment in this regard. 12 The disagreement in part reflects the systemic political differences of both countries. The U.S. position is that the Joint Communique is an executive branch decision, not an international treaty, and thus does not carry the force of law in the U.S. domestic political context. The TRA, however, does, and the Congress feels committed to Taiwan under this jurisdiction. In the Chinese political context, international law is believed to have precedence over a country's domestic law. The Chinese believe that there are strong international legal precedents that support their position that the TRA is an act that the U.S. uses to revise or cancel out their obligations under the 1982 bilateral, international agreement. 13 Three basic conditions were raised by the PRC as a condition of establishing diplomatic relations in 1979. The U.S. agreed to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdraw all military forces and installations from the island. The issue of arms sales to Taiwan was the eleventh hour impediment that nearly derailed the agreement to establish diplomatic relations. Only after assurances from President Carter that arms sales would be discrete, selective, and defensive did Deng Xiaoping reluctantly agree, leaving the issue of arms sales to a later date. The promise was that the White House would not volunteer public information about such sales. If asked, the U.S. government would say that the sale of selected, defensive arms after the expiration of the Mutual Defense Treaty would continue in a way that would not endanger the prospects of peace in the region.14 The TRA was drafted by the Carter administration as the Taiwan Enabling Act to amend U.S. law to deal with unofficial relations after normalization within the framework of these commitments. Congress essen-12. China claims its threat to use force is actually directed at foreign powers and forces of subversion. See "Jiang Zemin Congress Report," Xinhua, September 21, 1997, in FBIS, DR/C, September 23, 1997.
13. Among others, the Chinese cite Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments whatever its particular designation." See Liu Wenzong, "The Tai Equally important is the context of the budding strategic association between the two countries at the time the Joint Communique was signed. President Ronald Reagan rode into office that year determined to reverse the policies of the Nixon and Carter administrations by elevating relations with Taiwan to official status and demonstrate U.S. resolve for the defense of Taiwan by publicly supporting the high-profile sale of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. China's response to Reagan's shift in policy was to hinge the future of U.S.-PRC relations on the demand for a date certain to end to all arms sales. They could be phased out over time but Washington was to set a fixed date. The resulting agreement was a compromise that saw the Reagtn administration adopt the framework of Nixon and Carter with respect to arms sales and China accept a vaguely defined commitment for an end. This compromise was in part based on the prospective gains anticipated by both sides from the strategic association envisioned by the Reagan administration.
Beginning in 1979, the U.S. and PRC militaries had begun an extensive and prominent relationship that included conducting joint intelligence operations against the Soviet Union from Chinese soil. Coming on the heels of the The U.S. in effect adopted a dual China policy within the framework of its agreements on diplomatic recognition that Washington felt could be maintained given the strategic circumstances of the time. 
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In total, these circumstances have given the PLA a strong political influence over the PRC's Taiwan policy.21 Each time a senior PLA leader gives a speech abroad or to a visiting delegation there is a reference to Taiwan. Internally, there is no room for political debate among the civilian leadership on this issue lest it risk alienating the PLA. China's militarily coercive activity toward Taiwan and increasing anti-U.S. sentiment in the PRC are in part a reflection of this internal Chinese political dynamic. The conflict between the Joint Communique and the TRA is not simply one of defining the quality and quantity of arms or their defensive orientation, but rather a loggerhead at which fundamental foreign policy differences between the U.S. and China collide.
PLA Modernization
The post-cold war security environment has prompted a change in Chinese military strategy from one focusing on internal defense of the homeland to a more proactive regional orientation. Lessons learned from past conflicts, coupled with the example set by coalition forces in the Gulf War and Kosovo, have reinforced the urgent need for the PLA to modernize. The gap between its shift in strategy and developing the military capabilities to accomplish it represents a tremendous challenge for the PLA. While daunting for the most advanced military forces, for the PLA to make such a shift is made more difficult by its lack of technical orientation, the complexities involved in the integration of new weapon systems and tactics, and most importantly the sheer size of an antiquated force long reliant on political indoctrination rather than professional military training. The short-term response has been an effort to create pockets of excellence within the PLA, armed and trained with domestic and foreign assistance. Acquisitions of key Russian weaponry along with related technology transfers from other countries are seen as a means to shore up the immediate gap in a full range of military capabilities. Coordinate with this modernization are important changes in the education and training of the PLA. The goal is to create a smaller, highly educated force led by professional military officers less focused on political ideology than on the business of war, subordinate to the civilian leadership of the country.22
China's military modernization effort has met with a great deal of suspicion because of the lack of transparency in its strategic focus and the mili- 
Political and Economic Factors
China's economic development and internal security also figure into the arms sales equation because of the way these issues shape the government's response to the Taiwan issue. China is determined to control the pace of its economic development and political liberalization. Beijing faces a number of pressing and complex political and economic uncertainties. Communist leadership at the highest levels remains solidly authoritarian and elitist, but among the technocrats who comprise it the style is consensual. Although political competition is intense, it unfolds within a context of increasingly defined rules in which ideology plays little role. Indeed, China's leaders appear to be having success at substituting nationalism for communism as an ideology. Patriotism forms a major portion of their domestic political appeal, and as public sentiment over the Taiwan and Kosovo embassy bombing issues shows, it resonates effectively. It is likely that appeals to patriotism will become more frequent. Indeed, such appeals taken together with economic progress are seen as one of two key components in a performance-based strategy for retaining the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) domestic political legitimacy.
Economic development has been China's defining national priority since 1978, with military modernization ranking only fourth on the hierarchy of The capacity of the government to retain its legitimacy and keep the PLA focused on its path of professionalization will depend on its ability to achieve economic prosperity while controlling the evolution toward political pluralism.
Taiwan threatens the legitimacy of communist rule because it represents a Chinese society that offers a successful political and economic alternative. For the moment, there is tremendous popular pride on the mainland in the economic gains that China has made in recent decades. While this pride may discourage political unrest, it also has deepened the dilemmas the CCP lead-ership will face should the economy falter. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan exacerbate the depth of these problems by strengthening Taiwan's resolve, increasing its immunity to Chinese military coercion, and rendering China's leadership impotent to deal with "rebel movements and foreign incursion," i.e., an independent Taiwan independence and U.S. arms sales and military cooperation. In effect, arms sales to Taiwan involve the U.S. in an incredibly complex web of internal Chinese political, economic, cultural, and military dynamics that few policy makers in the U.S. seem to fully understand. Ironically, Beijing's efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and cut off the flow of arms have placed the U.S. firmly in the middle. To succeed with its goal of reunification, China must either persuade the U.S. to stop selling arms or somehow neutralize its power.
The Taiwanese recognize the dilemma that Beijing faces and seek to exploit it. But they also recognize that smooth relations between Washington and Beijing help to moderate Chinese behavior toward Taiwan and fear that the U.S. might someday succumb to PRC pressure and the exigencies of broader political and economic interests. Indeed, Taipei has expressed distress over statements made by President Clinton that seem to support Beijing's view of Taiwan's future. In its relations with the PRC, Taipei insists on equality and that Beijing cease its insistence on the one country, two systems formula. Taiwan wants China to stop impeding Taipei's attempts to expand its international space and renounce force as an option in their bilateral dealings. In the meantime, Taiwan has vigorously pursued pragmatic diplomacy in search of international support and arms. Taiwan' s determination to defend itself ultimately will depend on the steady flow of U.S. arms; the government in Taipei appears intent on demonstrating that Taiwan' s determination to fight any PRC military incursion imposes a moral obligation on the U.S. On the other hand, confrontation with Taiwan may be a handy release valve by which the CCP can deflect domestic pressures building in China. A patriotic nationalist campaign to recover a renegade province could successfully distract the Chinese people from the political and economic dissatisfactions that appear to be growing amid increasing efforts by the government to restrict organized threats to stability. However, the problem with committing to such a campaign is that sooner or later Beijing will have to act. Stuck in the middle, the U.S. itself has only limited options for how it can deal with future confrontations between China and Taiwan; furthermore, these options pose serious problems for the future of U.S.-PRC relations, including the very real prospects of armed conflict.
The U.S. cannot easily accept Beijing's contention that the Taiwan question is an internal matter of no concern to the U.S. Supporters of Taiwan have maintained since 1979 that Washington dare not allow Taiwan to be swallowed by China for fear that it would destabilize a region where the U.S. has enormous interests. Others point to the uncertainty surrounding China gaining control of the strategic waters around Taiwan. Principally, however, the fact is that the American president blamed for losing a democratic Taiwan to a communist China would find himself or herself in considerable political peril. Indeed, the fundamental political fact about U.S. attitudes since the opening to China is that effectively no constituency supports hurting Taiwan. Under different circumstances, Taiwan would be touted as a model for democratic transition, while in contrast China is depicted as the moral opposite by a myriad of special interests and Taiwan's lobby in Washington. Almost to a member, the mood in the present Congress toward China is decidedly dim. This attitude has created a powerful and politically charged push to supply Taiwan with weapons that comes from a U.S. military industrial complex seeking to maintain a high level of exports to leverage the costs of domestic military modernization amid a shrinking global demand for arms. The U.S. in essence has painted itself into a corner because it has failed to honor the commitments it has made to China in the past. The truth is not a currency easily converted by changed circumstances. The fundamental truth is that the U.S. promised China that it would show great restraint in providing limited and defensive arms to Taiwan during an ill-defined transition era that was to follow the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. The U.S. promised that during this transition it would shift its emphasis away from supplying arms to Taiwan and toward promoting the necessary dialogue and 640 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XL, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2000 negotiation that would help reconcile China and Taiwan. Doing such would allow these two entities to find a formula to live together in peace and create a transitional era in which the U.S. and China could then solve the problems left over from history while allowing their own relationship to move forward. Both Washington and Beijing had a great deal to gain from one another in 1979 and this remains the case today. Arms sales, however, are the major problem left over from history that prevents the relationship from developing as both governments would wish. Taiwan does not need more arms from the U.S. What it does need is help in both assimilating the diverse and sophisticated array of equipment it now has and reducing the influence of non-war fighting factors that seriously impinge the development of a modern force capable of executing its national military strategy. To help Taiwan achieve these objectives, the U.S. must shift from supplying arms overtly to a discreet strategy of advice and assistance designed to improve and rationalize Taiwan's force structure with its military objectives. This must be done in a way that would not violate the spirit of the TRA or give China the impression that Taiwan and the U.S. were developing a joint war fighting capability.
Conclusion
Fundamentally, the only real measure that will ensure that Taiwan's democracy and free market are never threatened by China is for there to be not a change in Taiwan's rhetoric about China but rather for China to become different by evolving into a more democratic, pluralist country that will not seek unity by force. Taiwan would find such a country a more attractive partner. What will make Taiwan diplomatically recognizable is a change in China; such change is already in progress and Taiwan and the U.S. can play a huge role in influencing the outcome. The only thing that Taiwan needs is time, and the key to buying time is not clarity but ambiguity. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the strengthening of their military relations when coupled with declarations of independence force clarity in Taiwan's relations with China and hence limit the options for all sides. Ambiguity is what in a sense bought time for Taiwan to make itself unignorable, and more ambiguity is what will buy it the time to make itself fully recognizable by allowing events in China to run their course. Reconciling the differences between the 1982 Joint Communique and the TRA may not be the answer but restoring a balance between the two is. Indeed, ambiguity and discretion may prove to have been the wisdom inherent in the framework of these documents by providing a flexible fulcrum upon which the U.S. can balance a difficult and complex issue. Thus, the formula exists for a peaceful resolution to this dispute; however, the U.S. needs to find the leadership and courage of conviction to honor its commitments in this regard.
